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Abstract 
In early 2019, the British government declassified a tranche of Information Research 
Department files. Among them is a candid and concise overview of British thinking about 
covert propaganda, complete with a list of examples of British forgery operations. This 
short piece transcribes the briefing note and provides an introduction. The document sheds 
new light on UK covert action, but also talks to ongoing scholarly debates in Intelligence 
Studies and International Relations more broadly.  
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In early 2019, the British government declassified a tranche of Information Research 
Department (IRD) files. Among them is a candid and concise overview of British thinking 
about covert propaganda, complete with a list of examples of British forgery operations.1 
It sheds new light on UK covert action, but also talks to ongoing scholarly debates in 
Intelligence Studies and International Relations more broadly.  
The IRD was created inside the Foreign Office in early 1948 to counter Soviet 
propaganda. Established under terms of the so-called Secret Vote, it expanded quickly and 
confidentially served a range of ‘clients’ from friendly governments and trade-union 
leaders, to Radio Free Europe and counter-subversion partners in the Middle East. 
Throughout much of its existence, and especially during its first two decades, the IRD 
focused on international communism. After the Suez Canal crisis in 1956, it gained a 
mandate to counter Arab nationalism, and, by the 1960s its activities extended to other 
hostile targets, including President Sukarno’s Indonesian regime. David Owen, the Labour 
Foreign Secretary, closed the IRD down in 1977.2  
The IRD engaged in unattributable propaganda. Generally speaking, it distributed 
material, often based on sanitised intelligence, into foreign media outlets through trusted 
contacts. The recently declassified files (FCO 168) cover policy and operational detail. In 
doing so, they provide a more holistic understanding of IRD and British propaganda; the 
existing files, FO 1110 and FCO 95, declassified in the 1990s and 2000s respectively, were 
generally less sensitive.  
The new documents make it clear that IRD was doing more than grey, or 
unattributable, propaganda: it also had ‘capacity for special political action in the 
Information field.’3 Special political action involved bribery, propaganda, covert political 
funding, and, ultimately, orchestrating coups.4 It is usually associated with the Secret 
Intelligence Service (SIS, or MI6) which had an SPA section from the early- to mid-1950s 
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as well as an SPA (Prop) unit dealing with black propaganda.5 The connection between 
IRD and black propaganda is greater than hitherto assumed.  
This is significant, not just on a bureaucratic level where overlap between SIS and 
IRD caused confusion,6  but on a democratic level. IRD was, after all, part of the Foreign 
Office and shut down partly because the foreign secretary thought such covert activity 
should not operate in a ‘grey zone’ outside of SIS.7  
The IRD document reproduced below was prepared as a brief for a restricted 
session of Anglo-American talks on propaganda in the summer of 1960. Under Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan, Britain had sought, from 1957, to develop interdependence 
with the United States through a series of working groups covering politics, economics, 
defence and covert action. The latter included operations in Indonesia, Syria, and Lebanon 
but many groups had fallen by the wayside by 1960 largely owing to lack of intelligence 
and intelligence sharing.8 An Anglo-American Information Working Group was still in 
existence; here officials met to discuss covert propaganda. 
 The document is fairly self-explanatory, but it sheds important light on issues 
central to ongoing debates about propaganda, secrecy, and covert action in International 
Relations. Three points warrant highlighting by way of introduction. 
First, it unequivocally demonstrates that Britain engaged in black propaganda and 
forgeries – and that the British seemingly thought they were good at it, or at least could 
wield it responsibly. Officials offered to take the lead over America in this difficult area, 
perhaps demonstrating a lingering sense of superiority in the fields of intelligence and 
covert action. Black radio, they noted, raised ‘hideous complications’; forgeries required 
months of planning, intelligence, and a collection of letter-heads and signatures to copy; 
and even whispering campaigns necessitated meticulous planning and a separate network 
of ‘oral agents,’ perhaps to separate intelligence gathering from covert action, as using 
the same agents for both risked polluting intelligence-gathering channels. Again 
highlighting the difficulty and amount of groundwork, all forms of black propaganda had 
to be based on outstanding intelligence. Despite the difficulties outlined, Britain 
demonstrated clear willingness to use forgeries: ‘we should not hesitate to draw a bow at 
a venture’. The British suggested that the US take the lead on grey, or unattributable, 
propaganda instead. 
The document even provides examples of British forgeries, usually thought of as a 
Soviet tactic, conducted between 1955 and 1960. British intelligence clearly thought that 
international front organisations, notably trade union federations such as WFTU and CTAL, 
were most vulnerable. Other examples listed include a 1956 pamphlet designed to look 
like an Egyptian government information leaflet suggesting a programme to supply oil to 
‘friends’ and deny it to ‘enemies’. The pamphlet circulated among American oil companies, 
but the US, whilst recognising it as black propaganda, had failed to identify the source.9  
 Second, the document is fascinating in light of recent debates about secrecy in 
International Relations, which unpacks deniability and examines the logic and politics of 
exposure.10 The British clearly recognised that exposure ‘must always be reckoned with.’ 
Importantly, and beyond this, they recognised that secrecy was not binary. Officials 
differentiated between disavowable operations, which could be denied but with potential 
embarrassment, and black operations, which should have had ‘no evidence of Western 
inspiration.’ Exposure of the latter could paradoxically be positive because it increased 
publicity – so long as British sponsorship remained hidden. However, exposure could be 
fatal to other operations.  
Black radio stations, the British assessed, could very rarely actually be black: at 
best they were ‘disavowable.’ Interestingly, this is slightly different from academic 
definitions of propaganda which define the shade – white, grey or black – around the level 
of disinformation involved and the creation of a false source.11 For British propagandists, 
definitions turned on deniability and how likely it could be traced back to the UK, even if 
the source was false. Under the broad banner of covert action, Britain differentiated 
between untraceable or black and disavowable or deniable operations. Doing so offered a 
more realistic understanding of plausible deniability, distinguishing secrecy from 
visibility.12  
 Third, understandings of success and failure are more nuanced than we might 
expect. Propaganda is more than about influencing a target’s thinking. It can instead (or 
as well) disrupt the adversary by sowing confusion or division, or, more simply, preoccupy 
the adversary’s security authorities with laborious investigations to uncover the source of 
a forgery. This ties in with Britain’s broader approach to covert action which emphasised 
disrupting targets.13  
When considering success, scholars have long debated the consequences of covert 
action.14 British officials were clearly aware of the risk of blowback, and they recognised 
the imprecise and uncontrollable nature of forgeries in a remarkably frank manner. What 
is interesting here, is the optimism espoused. The British, perhaps naively, almost 
embraced the unpredictable consequences, believing they could lead to unforeseen 
success. 
The deliberately imprecise objectives of covert propaganda also made measuring 
success difficult. This is equally striking, for it seemingly counters best practice of setting 
clear, reasonable and measurable objectives.15 The approach instead emphasised picking 
a precise, narrow, target and then hoping for the best and seeing what happened. 
Measuring outcomes was difficult, but it could be achieved through ‘customer research’. 
One such means involved covert opinion surveys designed to ascertain the effect of a 
particular message.16  
The IRD sharply expanded in the early 1960s: from 227 members of staff worldwide 
in 1960 to a peak of 362 in 1965.17 British special political action, more broadly, followed 
suit. Such operations cost £455,000 each year in the late 1950s, and officials expected 
this to more than triple to £1.5million in the early 1960s.18 This document offers a useful 





UNITED STATES – UNITED KINGDOM INFORMATION WORKING GROUP MEETINGS 
JUNE 1960 
 
UNITED KINGDOM BRIEF 
 
Techniques of Covert Propaganda 
 
A. “Black” Propaganda. (We can take the lead) 
This may be divided into oral and written. 
 
(i) Oral 
Black radio is a well-established technique but raises hideous 
complications which make it unsuitable in exceptional circumstances. The 
main considerations are:- 
 
(a) Security. It is almost impossible to conceal the location of the 
transmitter from R.D.F. [Radio Direction Finding]; and it is often 
difficult to camouflage local staff and studio arrangements. If the 
operation is on our own territory this means the operations becomes at 
best “disavowable” rather than black and a possible source of 
embarrassment if questions are asked in Parliament. It is therefore 
preferable if it can be on somebody else’s territory and mobile if 
possible. 
(b) Staff. Announcers at least must be nationals of the target country. This 
nearly always raises acute problems of morale, loyalty and security. 
(c) Audience. There must be an audience in the target country who have 
the means of hearing (in spite of jamming) and are psychologically 
receptive to the broadcasts. 
(d) Duration. Although it must be given sufficient time to attract an 
audience its efficacy is probably limited in time. Sooner or later the 
novelty wears off and the bluff is called. Nevertheless it can become 
quickly effective again in moment of crisis. 
[p.2] 
Past experience is patchy. [3 lines redacted] The communist operations against Iran, 
Turkey and Greece are not really “black” but have some impact in times of crisis; they 
represent the threat of communist power. Egyptian operations against Iraq, Jordan and 
Lebanon were also patchy, and in no case decisive. [half a line redacted] 
Situation in Laos and Indonesia might be suitable for such operations. 
Whispering campaigns can be effective, but to be done properly they require 
creation of separate networks of oral agents and detailed planning. We doubt if it is 
worth a major effort, but would use it if a suitable opportunity target appeared and a 
network was available.  
(ii) Written 
We have found the chief value of “black” pamphlets and letters is more 
often disruption rather than propaganda, though one is not inconsistent 
with the other, and an essential element is exposure of some fact which 
the communists wish to conceal. Some examples of our operations are:- 
(a) W.F.T.U. [World Federation of Trade Unions] booklet (1955) 
(b) Oil pamphlet (1956) 
(c) C.T.A.L. [Confederación de los Trabajadores de América Latina] 
questionnaire (1957) 
(d) W.F.T.U. booklet (Iraq) (1960) 
(e) Letter on Chinese bomb (1960) 
The following considerations seem to us to be important:- 
(a) Targets. These should usually be narrow, e.g. a particular organisation 
or delegation or individual not communism or the Russians in general. 
Front organisations with their international ramifications and 
heterogeneous staff are particularly vulnerable. But the objective itself 
need not be precise; once the operation is launched it is usually out of 
our control and its course and effects largely unpredictable (e.g. the 
W.F.T.U. operation succeeded in an unforeseen manner). Once we 
have selected a suitable target and are satisfied that a “heads we win 
tails you lose” situation exists we should not hesitate to draw a bow at 
a venture. Even if it achieves nothing else the investigation by the 
communists has its own disruptive effects. 
(b) Intelligence. This must be 100% correct and up-to-date. 
[p.3] 
(c) Production. Style, paper, printing etc. must all be replicas of the 
genuine article. This may entail months of work. Our Missions have 
standing instructions to collect letter-heads, signatures etc. 
(d) Distribution. Posting must be done from “likely” places, if possible 
according to communist precedent. Addresses should not be 
unnecessarily numerous but include sufficient spread to give maximum 
change of a successful reaction in one quarter or another. Some items 
may be specifically aimed at bringing information to the attention of 
censorship and security authorities. 
(e) Exposure must always be reckoned with. Provided there are no 
mistakes and no evidence of Western inspiration this usually does not 
matter (e.g. W.F.T.U. in Vienna); it is sometimes a positive advantage 
because it gives further publicity (e.g. Egyptian oil pamphlet). It is 
important to take this into account in planning. If exposure would be 
fatal to an operation it is probably not worth doing. 
(f) Consumer research. Assessment of results if even more difficult than 
usual, but special arrangements should be made if possible. 
 
B. Unattributable (Grey) Propaganda. (We should ask the Americans to lead) 
Our problems in this field are mainly of outlets. These can be roughly classified as 
follows:- 
(i) Personal Contacts in Britain. Editors, journalists, writers, dons, etc. who 
receive our material and ask for briefing on specific subjects. Under this 
heading we have a panel of letter writers on various subjects. 
(ii) Personal Contacts Abroad. Information Officers mainly but also other 
member of Missions [1 line redacted] have similar contacts according to 
local conditions. Some of these contacts receive payments. 
(iii) Control of Existing Newspapers and Magazines. This can vary from full 
clandestine ownership (e.g. Gulf Times) to partial control. This is 
expensive and complicated; it is therefore a pis aller. 
(iv) Control of News Agencies, e.g. A.N.A. [Arab News Agency], N.A.F.E.N. 
[Near and Far East News Agency], STAR [focused on Pakistan] also 
expensive, and value often only indirect and pre-emptive according to 
circumstances. They cannot and should not try to compete with the giants 
(A.P. [Associated Press], U.P. [United Press], Reuters, etc.). But they can 
provide special background material which the giants don’t. They should 
therefore be allowed to operate where conditions are suitable, i.e. they are 
not “good in themselves.” 
[p.4] 
(v) Special Productions, e.g. “Bulletin of International Committee for the 
Investigation of Communist Front Organisations”. This is mainly a device 
for using a notional organisation to circulate semi-secret intelligence about 
“front” organisations. It has been remarkably successful. 
(vi) Control of Non-Communist Organisations. We share interests with the 
Americans in many of these, e.g. COSEC [Co-ordinating Secretariat of 
National Unions of Students], W.V.F. [World Veterans’ Federation], 
Congress of Cultural Freedom etc. They are very useful and some have 
their own publicity organs (e.g. Encounter etc.). There are also other 
organisation in the international field under varying degrees of control and 
influence which are useful in making a positive approach on a non-
governmental plane. This may be important in Africa, and indeed wherever 
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